Global Systemic Risk and International RegulatoryCoordination: Squaring Sovereignty and Financial Stability

Authored by Ross P Buckley & Federico Lupo-Pasini

Forthcoming in American University International Law Review

In recent years much attention has been given to systemic risk and maintaining financial stability. Much of the focus, rightly, has been on market failures and the role of regulation in addressing them. This article looks at the role of domestic policies and government actions as sources of global instability. The global financial system is built upon global markets controlled by national financial and macroeconomic policies. In this context, regulatory asymmetries, diverging policy preferences, and government failures add a further dimension to global systemic risk not present at the national level. Systemic risk is a result of the interplay between two independent variables: an underlying trigger event, in this analysis a domestic policy measure, and a transmission channel. The solution to systemic risk requires tackling one of these variables. In a domestic setting, the centralization of regulatory power into one single authority makes it easier to balance the delicate equilibrium between enhancing efficiency and reducing instability. However, in a global financial system in which national financial policies serve to maximize economic welfare, regulators will be confronted with difficult policy and legal tradeoffs. We investigate the role that financial regulation plays in addressing domestic policy failures and in controlling the danger of global financial interdependence. To do so we analyze global financial interconnectedness, and explain its role in transmitting instability; we investigate the political economy dynamics at the origin of regulatory asymmetries and government failures; and we discuss the limits of regulation.

 

Originally Published: 
07/09/2015